Nietzsche applies his genealogical method to a number of things in his immediate culture. One thing he does not analyse in this way is his naturalistic values. Neither does he scrutinise his belief that what is important is the flourishing of ‘higher’ men.

In addition to this there are a number of words he chooses not to use philology to analyse. Southwell notes that if one gives a philological account of the word sacrifice on encounters strong   elements of the individual reaching fulfilment as well as surrendering oneself to God.

Simon May wonders whether Nietzsche may have retained more than he realised from the system he rejects. May mentions the belief that suffering has some sort of meaning. This in fact leads to a further, and oft made, criticism that these views were more biographical than anything else.

Lack of analytic argument / unfalsifiability

Foot is absolutely correct in stating that, for the analytic philosopher, Nietzsche is approached with great difficulty. Kenny describes his writing as ‘wilfully chaotic’. He is rarely explicit about his premises and how these inform his conclusions. His style is even sometimes accused of being ‘inimical’ to reason. Foot is also right in stating that it is a mark of respect to a philosopher to investigate whether what they claim is in fact true. There are  other thinkers who interpret Nietzsche as claiming that truth is not there and so claim that this is a doomed enterprise.

If, however, we read Nietzsche as a naturalist who seeks to free higher men from MPS it is likely that we will learn much from evaluating his account. Janaway defends Nietzsche’s ‘emotive’ style, understanding it as fundamental to the argument made in GM. To grasp this we need to remind ourselves of Nietzsche’s feelings about tragedy in Ancient Greece. It was Socrates he blames for favouring the Apollonian vision of reason and comprehensibility at the expense of that of Dionysus. In other works Nietzsche refers to himself as a disciple of Dionysus (who represents choas in contrast to Apollo). Bearing this in mind, it would have been strange for Nietzsche to utilise the tools of the system from which he is trying to liberate us to do it. He believes that philosophy made its mistake when it became purely rational. It forgot he cries, what made man man. With Socrates’ over emphasis on reason, and complete denial of emotion, philosophy became less than human. Nietzsche doesn’t have any interest in reluctant converts. He seeks great men who hear the rhetoric and say ‘Yes’.

For Southwell this is whole question is most frustrating when one seeks to take Nietzsche seriously. Discussing ressentiment he notes that it is the inaccessibility of another’s, or even my own subconscious, that makes the issue so difficult. Popper’s critique of Frued seems to apply equally to Nietzsche in that is is difficult (though perhaps possible) to think of what might falsify his account. It may also be that other significant criticisms made of Freud, can point to limits of Nietzsche’s method. Barbara von Eckhart accuses Freud of only using one criterion of truthfulness when proposing his theory: that of explanatory power. Simply put, this means if a theory can explain more of the observable phenomena it is more likely correct. This is both reasonable, and is a tool still relied upon by philosophers and scientists alike. However, simply because a theory explains all of the observable phenomena it does not follow deductively that it is correct (though it might well be). In the end it will be the reader who must decide for themselves if the WTP becomes a theory that could in fact explain any observation (like Freud’s) or it is in fact more resilient when faced with Popper’s criticism. Another way to state this might be to ask whether ressentiment (or WTP, or TOV) is simply a creation of Nietzsche’s? This is discussed in more detail below.

FN on Free Will

Some critics thinks that Nietzsche’s views on free will were mistaken and use this as a reason to reject his whole project. Later existentialists have found his determinism problematic, even dispensable. Clearly Sartre would take real issue with the parable of eagles and lambs for, in line with N’s naturalistic outlook, it says very strongly that essence precedes existence. Yet the more one reads Nietzsche, it becomes clear that he is no determinist in the ordinary sense of the word. Though no lamb could choose to fly, it is possible (and upsetting) that an eagle may choose to eat grass an stay earthbound. The free will that Nietzsche rejects is the ‘ought implies can’ of Kant’s absolute and ‘Christian’ morality.

Still others voice the complaint that his whole book is about ‘guilt’ (HP: which requires free will) yet rejects that humans have real (metaphysical) freedom. This inconsistency, they say, shows Nietzsche’s account to be less than unified. While on the face of it this appears to be a reasonable complaint, after a little thought it becomes clear that this attack is ill-founded. The whole point of Nietzsche’s account is that concepts like guilt and free will depend upon the transvaluation of values, not the other way around. This mistake is the same as that outlined in the introduction.

‘Banishing’ metaphysics

Nietzsche’s naturalism entails a rejection of metaphysics, which a number of critics have sought to use against him. One of the major difficulties is that a number of very significant thinkers see problems with his reason for rejecting religion. Nietzsche does this, it is clear, because of the ‘other-worldy’ element he perceives. He is clear on this in a number of passages. The importance laid on ‘heaven’ leads to bizarre and unhealthy behaviour on earth (think only about why a charity like Christian Aid had to make its slogan what it did for proof of this). If we believed that ‘religion’ was not something essentially metaphysical, as Wittgenstein did, then it seems Nietzsche’s case against religion is weakened. Wittgenstein’s approach, that religion was something more expressive, denies the charge of ‘projection’. It is, however, not without it’s critics and you should consider what you think about it before the exam (the reason it is criticised is that, it is argued, an expressive account of religion would expect to see less diversity). William James also denied that religions were essentially metaphysical, but for different reasons. (more later)

Secondly, Nietzsche claimed that metaphysical definitions of ‘good’ were simply human creations. In the ethics section we discussed G E Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy, which states exactly the opposite. You will remember that Moore had a vast array of critics and that these included the philosophers Ayer and Stevenson (emotivism). By rejecting these definitions of ‘good’, Nietzsche is going right back to Socrates and pointing at what the former thinks was philosophy’s biggest mistake. Both of these criticisms are highly philosophical and might be of little interest to the religious believer.

Thirdly, in contrast to these, there are a growing number of ‘Christian’ readings of Nietzsche that see him as an ally in the battle to rid their faith of ‘bad religion’. Paul Tillich was a Christian theologian who argued that the God whom Nietzsche proclaims dead is the one created, and prayed to, in church – Feuerbach’s ‘big man in the sky’. This, he says, has nothing in common with the God of Psalm 139.

Finally, there is one point of consistency. One might ask whether Nietzsche’s WTP is not, in fact, a metaphysical proposition. Clearly Nietzsche hopes to convince his readership that it is not and that the WTP is in fact a psychological, and so physiological, drive (more next section).

A naturalist’s conflict with science…

In contemporary philosophy there are two sorts of interpretations of Nietzsche’s attack on morality. On the one hand there are ‘post-modern’ interpreters like Deleuze and Foucault who read him as attacking the very nature of truth itself. On the other, readers like Janaway and Leiter see Nietzsche as a naturalist. This word can mean a number of things but it seems likely that in Nietzsche’s case it is best used to draw one’s attention to the fact that he attempts to explain features of the world with no appeal to the supernatural. In so doing he mimics the approach he saw in science. Unfortunately this raises more questions than it answers. To begin with, it seems odd that a man mimicking something should also turn on it with such aggression. The is also the matter of where Nietzsche parts company with scientific orthodoxy: The doctrine of the Will to Power.

In order to understand the first of these, it will help to clarify what exactly it is that Nietzsche finds so offensive about the ‘science’ of his day. Scientists, though Nietzsche does think there are some exceptions, are generally using their position or credentials to gain power over others. In doing so, he finds them guilty of the same over-arching ‘truth claiming’ that is present in Christianity. Science, in fact is perfectly positioned for such a position of power as it is able to herald ‘objective truth’ in exactly the same way the Christians used monotheism. Again it becomes apparent that any ‘objective’ and universal account is to be rejected. Firstly for the fact that all men are not equal and secondly because objective perception is, for him, an oxymoron. This view is sometimes called perspectivism.

On reflection, it also become more obvious that the WTP is not a completely Darwinian concept. We have already mention how big an influence this man was on Nietzsche but it is clear that he thinks Darwin missed something. In the biological sciences any discussion of a base drive that is responsible for everything is going to involve some sort of genetic ‘will to survive’ or reproduce. What Nietzsche is proposing is importantly different (Southwell is particularly clear here). Where the biologist stresses mechanism, being fittest and survival as supremely important categories; Nietzsche changes all of these. The WTP suggests that humans, at least, are more than mechanism or feel like they are. This is called vitalism and would not be entertained in contemporary science (due to Ockham’s). Nietzsche is also more concerned with the ‘higher’ men rather than those with best adapted for survival. On this point, it seems, Darwin and Nietzsche might be able to agree. Nietzsche claims that the higher men are often weaker which (if the only telos involved in evolution is survival) is certainly non-contradictory (could add telos problem?). Biology, however, with its materialistic assumptions will never be able to see the will to power. How is the reader is to make her mind up here? It seems to come down to how you see things. If you ‘have eyes to see’ the will to power, then it seems you certainly will. Before moving on it is worth noticing that even Nietzsche’s most charitable interpreters consider him as suffering from a sort of ‘philosophical tunnel-vision’ in his later works. In his last texts he blames almost every problem in the world on MPS.

In one sense this is more than understandable. Nietzsche was fully aware that the WTP was a key doctrine for his assault on morality. Leiter goes as far as to call it ‘foundational’. Nietzsche admits as much in GM. His descriptions of ressentiment, the revolt and what is wrong with slave morality all depend on the WTP. Indeed, were it replaced by a more Darwinian account, Nietzsche’s entire psychological account would collapse.

There are still, however, a number of questions not yet answered by this description. The reader may well want to ask about this further. Is it the case that the negation of the will can be an expression if the will? Does Nietzsche’s account of WTP stray onto the grounds of metaphysics that he has already denied? What about other psychological accounts that suggest a different drive as ‘lord of all’? A number of this questions are closely related to the age old question of egoism: do people ever do genuinely selfless good deeds? You will remember that in class we decided that this may be one of the questions that is, in fact, genuinely beyond us. It is such an important question, leading to other even more important questions, that a number of philosopher have decided to opt for what they perceive to be the most likely perspective and base their work on that probability.

A final, more philosophical discussion might concern the objectivity that Nietzsche denies science.

The ‘Historicity’ of his account 

In BGE Nietzsche claims that the history of philosophy has three distinct periods. First of all there was the ‘pre-moral’, a period he associates with consequentialism. This period, he says, ended about ten thousand years ago. Following that there was the moral stage which becomes more about intentions and individual act that the moral agent should not do (we know who he is thinking of here). This is probably the stage in which the majority of unreflective Britons find themselves. And finally, Nietzsche predicts a new naturalistic age.

While some interpreters (like Southwell) understand Nietzsche as heralding a new age that is unavoidable, such an assertion will seem strange to those who have read GM. Here, Nietzsche seems genuinely concerned with the extinction of the human raise due to their own life-denial. Southwell is certainly correct, however, to deny that the fact this new age has not materialised is a fatal ‘black mark’ against the Nietzschean account. Certainly this may in future come to be. A sociologist would not need to look to far that things may be heading in this direction either.

A further and more general criticism of Nietzsche’s historicity would be to question, when one moves beyond the rhetoric of ‘history properly practiced’, what actual evidence is offered for his account. We have talked about philology and will not discuss it further here. In terms of tangible, analysable evidence we are forced to admit that there is little. Yet far from being damning, Leiter argues that when we understand what Nietzsche is doing properly that, the negativity of this pales into insignificance. Leiter’s argument rests on the premise that Nietzsche most likely considers ‘history’ (as an academic discipline) to be infected by the 2000 year history that we are now no longer able to see beyond. Such an understanding appears entirely consistent with Nietzsche’s project. He also notes that there is significant evidence in note form that Nietzsche was a keen reader of the most recent historical research. As such it would be a mistake to read him as unhistorical; ahistorical would be a better description. Both of these defences seem more than plausible. Whether they are both compatible might be another question worthy of a fuller discussion.

Though we have discussed ‘historical blindness’ already it may help to clarify a number of points. Certainly if we are to defend Nietzsche using this initially surprising doctrine it is proper to consider the evidence for it. Indeed when it is noted that this blindness only extends to past values not past events a convincing explanation seems all the more essential. Why is it that we know about the advent of the Holy Roman Empire, the associated change in attitude towards sex but are unable to see the transvalutaion of values.

 Nietzsche gives three reasons. Firstly, slave morality won and in so doing claimed not just to be the ‘better’ morality but its sole meaning. Secondly there are the misleading but intuitive histories of Reé et al. These accounts fall victim to the first point and accept the orthodox but incorrect view that morality means anything more than ‘usefulness’. Thirdly Nietzsche highlights the lack of philological expertise directed at this question.

We should also remind ourselves that this blindness, for Nietzsche, is incomplete. There are psychological elements of master morality in many of us. And, conveniently for Nietzsche, those who can see this in their psychology are his target audience, those who cannot are not.

Real Evil

Clearly Nietzsche was not the ‘proto-Nazi’ that he was interpreted to be in the post-war anglophone world. This said, Fraser questions whether the Shoah leaves Nietzsche looking rather naive. Riccoeur notes that Nietzsche’s use of evil usually carries connotations of hatred and revenge. When we call the holocaust ‘evil’ he suggests we a using it in a different way. Certainly it is a ridiculous straw man to disregard Nietzsche as saying ‘evil is secretly good’. And then to argue holocaust really was bad, therefore Nietzsche is wrong. We have discussed the charge of antisemitism at length and I would suggest that anyone who finds him guilty of this charge has not seriously engaged with this polemic.

How then should I live?

There appears to me an increase in the number of people who criticise Nietzsche as having, perhaps like Kant, quite a strong negative philosophy alongside a remarkably weak positive account. Put another way his ‘no’ against Christianity’s morality is powerful but his guidance on how we should live is lacking.

I will need to come back and write more on this, but for now I would only make a few quick observations. Firstly, Keith Ansell Pearson (2005) is surely right to point out that this perception is formed through only reading Nietzsche’s later books and neglecting the earlier works which are, he correctly claims, characterised by a ‘yea-saying’ attitude (5). Secondly, and related to this, Nietzsche himself describes GM as a polemic. By genre, then, we should expect a writer such as Nietzsche to stick closely to the style expected.

J Burt 2013